with the same title. The book is dedicated to a twofold but paradoxical objective: the elucidation of and the liberation from metaphors of illness (4) . On the one hand, Sontag's analysis distances itself from metaphoricization. It expressly disallows the notion of illness as metaphor: ". . . the most truthful way of regarding illness-and the healthiest way of being ill-is one most purified of, most resistant to, metaphoric thinking" (3) .
On the other hand, the book devotes itself in large part to the description of metaphors of illness. Modern metaphors of illness, especially those based on descriptions of tuberculosis and cancer, Sontag believes, suggest "a profound disequilibrium between individual and society, with society conceived as the individual's adversary" (73). Metaphors of illness are given such extensive scope and weight in Sontag's work on the subject that any notion of an "appropriate" diagnosis and treatment is moved out of sight, her conclusion notwithstanding. Consequently, Sontag's vision of a demystification of illness remains distant, if not vacuous.
In the following, I attempt to resolve the paradoxes arising from this apparent contradiction. In order to assess the ambiguous suppositions involved-the ubiquitousness of metaphoric constructions of illness on the one hand, and the liberation from metaphors on the other hand-the structures of metaphor would have to be identified and differentiated. These in turn would have to be analyzed within the framework of an archaeology of knowledge. Thirdly, and this is probably the most intriguing question, one would have to inves-tigate how certain metaphoric constructions can arise from superseded knowledge formations and resurface in peculiarly modern functions. Finally, we would have to address the question thrown up by Sontag's account of illness-as-metaphor: namely how the role of metaphor can be conceptualized, both in its mythical functions and in its occurrence in scientific statements.
Only a historically and structurally differentiated account of metaphor would, I would argue, allow us to explain how metaphorical language can function both in a "pre-scientific" and in a scientific context, as well as in the context of pre-critical or uncritical modern mythologies-namely in those instances where sciences or cosmologies have not been able to formulate precise causal connections. It is particularly in these contexts that metaphor offers unique linguistic possibilities for causal explanations, whose different structures would have to be determined more specifically.
The different possibilities offered by metaphoric constructions have been the subject of philosophical debate since the 1960s, especially in Anglo-American philosophy. Analytical philosophy usurped the task of semiotics and rhetoric in developing the theory and medieval systems of logic, while providing analyses of types of analogy, have not attempted a justification of the validity of analogical arguments (Hesse 63) . More specifically, the type of semiotics that informs Susan Sontag's treatise on Illness as Metaphor cannot fully account for the complex requirements and functions of metaphor. This, however, is not a new insight. As early as 1756, the German philosopher Ernst Anton Nicolai (1722 Nicolai ( -1802 lashed out polemically at a comparable type of medical semiotics, which had solidified into an institutionalized academic discipline. Nicolai acknowledges that medical semiotics devoted itself to the study of the "facts and processes of the human body" but criticizes the semoticians' incapability of explaining or causally analyzing those facts and processes. A causal explanation, according to Nicolai, would fall into the domain of philosophical knowledge. In his critique, which seems equally relevant today and which could be made to pertain to Susan Sontag's description of Illness as Metaphor, Nicolai calls for philosophical inquiry as a condition for the discovery of causality essential for medical diagnosis:
Philosophical inquiry enables one to apply historical insights in select cases, and indicates the conditions under which this 2 Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1998] Hess 60) . The symptom can remain silent, its signifying function can be effaced, the sign is no longer the speaking symptom. Foucault quotes Condillac in stating that " 'every symptom is a sign' by right, 'but not every sign is a symptom' in the sense that the totality of symptoms will never be able to exhaust the reality of the sign" (93).
The evidence and certainty of symptoms as indicators of illness becomes shaky. Diagnosis is determined probabilistically through the observation of a random configuration of signs in a converging series: coughing, chronic fever, expectoration, and hemoptysis make phthisis more and more probable. It becomes a matter of reading a particular pathological state in the course of its evolution, and of foreseeing its most probable development (Foucault 160-61). The nature of co-incidence is being determined more precisely, and is being brought into a causal relation with the illness in question (qtd. in Hess 55) . The attempt of a causal determination of co-incidence becomes the foundation of a theoretically elaborated symptomatology; from a phenomenon of illness, its hidden cause is being inferred (qtd. in Hess 56) . These developments deepen the legitimation crisis of a semiotic medicine. While semiotic medicine abstracts characteristic symptoms from a multiplicity of individual signs, diagnostic medicine relates the symptom as effect to a cause (Eckart 4) . Hence it is no longer signs that form the basis of diagnosis and assessment of illness; the coterie of diagnoses shift to the role of temporally organized converging series (Hess 87 
4
Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1998] The philosophical foundation of the sciences of life, with its method of showing causally conditioned functional relations, opened the way for new diagnostic, prognostic, and therapeutic possibilities and clinical methods in medicine. Physiologists of the nineteenth century turned against their natural historian predecessors with accusations of ontologizing illness and disease (i.e., of elevating disease to the status of an organism within an organism and, correspondingly, of viewing disease as proceeding according to its own laws), of confusing the cause or the contagium with the disease itself, and of engaging in unscientific classification of "species" of disease more botanico (Hess 258) .
Thus the 1830s and 1840s mark a turning point in academic medicine. The term 'semiotics' is being eradicated from medical textbooks, and the concept of 'diagnostics' makes its entry (Eckart 11) . In those isolated cases where a semiotic notion of the sign survives, it appears in the context of a static description or naming of states of illness or individual constitution, devoid of any reference to or proof of causal connections. Henceforth semiotics finds its place in eclectic practices which reject theorization. Incapable of diagnosis, medical semiotics finds itself reduced to phenomenology (Hess 252 ). This supersession of semiotic by diagnostic medicine does not, however, spell the end of the significance and modelling function of linguistics for medicine. In a move parallel to the paradigm shift in medical diagnosis, a purely semiotic concept of the sign becomes untenable in linguistics. The introduction of the temporal factor, which facilitates the conceptualization of causal relations, becomes the acid test not only for medicine, but likewise for linguistics and narratology. The mutual imbrication of temporal sequence and logical consequence, which the scholastics captured in the formula post hoc, ergo propter hoc (whereby what is temporally post-appears as the effect of a logically preceding cause), finds its systematic application here (Barthes 248) . However, this mutual imbrication can be accounted for only at the cost of a dualism which makes its effects felt both in the history of medicine and in the history of linguistics: namely the dualism between synchrony and diachrony, which becomes definitive of both modern linguistics and diagnostic medicine. For the case of anatomo-clinical medicine, Foucault remarks:
The clinician's gaze was directed upon a succession and upon an area of pathological events; it had to be both synchronic and diachronic, but in any case it was placed under temporal obedience; it analysed a series. (162-63) On the introduction of the temporal dimension into linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure notes: ". . . if we considered the community of speakers without considering time, we would not see the effect of the social forces that influence language" (78) .
The introduction of the temporal dimension, according to de Saussure, has the following effect:
Language is no longer free, for time will allow the social forces at work on it to carry out their effects. This brings us back to the principle of continuity, which cancels freedom. But continuity necessarily implies change, varying degrees of shifts between the signified and the signifier. (78) The mastery of time as duration in medicine similarly changes the configuration of relations involved in signification. The sign in
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Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1998] Metaphors fulfilling this function, termed "theory-constitutive metaphors" by Boyd, are non-semiotic and therefore do not allow for exegesis. Any attempt to decode them is misplaced. Instead, they lead readers to discover a terminology for theory-constitution (360-61).
Considering the paradigm shift dividing semiotic from diagnostic medicine, and the paradigm shift breaking up a monistic semiotic concept of the sign, Susan Sontag's description of illness in terms of a semiotic understanding of metaphor seems puzzling. The most common description of metaphors of illness as expression of a disturbed social order is based on a homologous correlation between signifier and signified, and in an extended sense between denotation and connotation. The description of the function and modus operandi of modern myths merges with the description of the object of myth-making. This procedure presupposes what it sets out to explain, thereby creating a circulus vitiosus, based on the notion of metaphor as the transposition of meaning confined to the word. Where the word is chosen as basic unit of a tropology, the transposition characteristic of metaphor is limited to substitution. Metaphor utilized for purposes of substitution produces zero information value. Where the tension between the literal and the metaphorical is missing at the outset, substitutive metaphors contribute to mythologization, rather than critically unpacking it. In the process, substitutive metaphors reveal themselves as dead metaphors, which cancel themselves out as metaphors, as they are taken up by everyday language.
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Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1998] (Feyerabend 271 ). This leads the Campbellian (in Mary Hesse's construed dialogue about "The Function of Models") to stipulate that if the observation-predicates in the theory are uninterpreted, the interpretation given by the model (or metaphor) must conform to the terms of the theory: the whole theory must have a model interpretation, which also provides an interpretation of the theoretical predicates through the correlation of (interpreted) observation-predicates with the theoretical predicates. (Otherwise one could not explain how the observation-predicates get into the theory, to enable it to make predictions [Hesse 45] .)
The circularity which results from the tenet that models/metaphors have an explanatory or heuristic or filling-the-gap role in cases of incommensurability between or within theoretical statements and are yet subject to an incommensurability in relation to scientific theory, is evident in both Feyerabend's and Hesse's accounts of the role of models and metaphors in science. The resulting dilemma can be characterized in other words as follows: if incompletely understood meaning-terms are clarified by recourse to existing notions from a different domain, treating the new as a special case of things already understood (as is the case with substitutive metaphors), then the possibility of conceptual discovery is considerably reduced (Feyerabend 256) . This dilemma, arising from the circularity in the interarticulation of incommensurability and the role of models/metaphors, leads both the Duhemist and the Campbellian in Mary Hesse's construed dialogue to address the type of analogy/ model/metaphor in terms of which one can draw one-to-one correspondences between models and observation-predicates before one has elaborated the theory, by positing some kind of prescientific recognition of analogies .
This dilemma provides good reason to unravel Susan Sontag's reflections on illness-as-metaphor once more instead of relegating them to the sphere of ideological mythmaking (albeit at a metalevel). It turns out that the metaphors of illness described by Sontag arise largely as a result of precarious causal relations due to the fact that the etiology of the diseases concerned was not understood. This is acknowledged by Sontag for the case of tuberculosis in the last century, and for cancer and HIV today (5, (86) (87) (88) (Bleker 196, 200, 203) . Specific diseases were being identified with the bacteria linked to them; and bacteria, in turn, were personified as "the enemy." The dialogue between medical theory and the respective contemporary political jargon is one of the factors accounting for the rapid success and growing popularity of the new science of bacteriology (Gradmann 44) . Gradmann summarizes his observations on the notions of illness promulgated in the process of the popularization of bacteriology as follows:
No distinction is made between disease and its causative agent. 12
Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1998] The vertical relations in this case are not specifically causal. There also does not seem to be any horizontal relation of similarity between the terms, except by virtue of the fact that the two pairs are related by the same vertical relation. Thus, there is no horizontal relation independent of the vertical relation. In contrast to predictive analogies, the analogies/metaphors mentioned here serve to bolster an argument which implicitly passes from asserting relations which are already recognized to persuading the listener/viewer/ reader that other relations follow from these 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1998] Virchow, however, opposes this conclusion by urging caution:
We must not forget that the history of our sciences offers a great number of facts which teach us that appearances of striking similarity can act in very different ways and achieve very different effects. my 
translation)
What Virchow voices here is his suspicion that the monocausal explanations of bacteriology are untenable. Without wanting to question bacteriology's discovery of specific disease causation, the physiologists mooted their assumption that the infected organism itself might have a role to play in process of the disease. The principles of conditionalism arising from this assumption were formulated by Max Verworn (Causal and Conditional World View, 1912) and David von Hansemann. Quite independently, a concept of multifactorial causation came to be accepted as a principle of immunology. At the same time, the notion of the specific effectivity of antibodies was retained. In his textbook on The Methods of Immunodiagnostics and Immunotherapy (1910) , Julius Citron elaborates on these principles:
We know now that the progress of an infectious disease depends not only on the type, the quantity, and the virulence of the disease germ, but also on the behaviour of the organism. The disease must be seen from the viewpoint of the reciprocal effect arising from these two groups of factors, although it is impossible to determine in detail the specific effect of the causative agent and its products, and that of the reactive power of the organism. (qtd. in Fleck 55) This new version of the concept of causality shows a closer correspondence to the Kantian notion of "purposiveness of nature" The history of bacteriology offers numerous examples of reversions to substitutive metaphors as well as their revision. The initial search for syphilitic substances in the blood of supposed syphilitics contributed to the mistaken assumption of the specificity of the Wassermann reaction. The frequency of the (false) positive reactions was invoked in declaring syphilis a national pandemic-a "national enemy" which had to be combated. The chemotherapeutic discoveries at the beginning of the twentieth century were similarly substantialized and metaphoricized. Salvarsan was labeled either "magic bullet" or "devil's stuff." The former label was applied in the hope of killing the specific causative agents of syphilis with a single injection without impairing other bodily functions. The latter label was invoked in the scandalizing of the new chemotherapy which became a media event, especially with reports about the allegedly lethal side effects of Salvarsan. These particular metaphors belie the fact that the successes of Paul Ehrlich and his collaborators were based on the systematic utilization of the affinities of chemical dyes for the production of synthetic antigens. Ehrlich himself, in taking up and simultaneously countering the then common metaphor of syphilis as "Amor's poisoned arrow," consequently coined an alternative metaphor (or, in Gradmann' s account of the popularization of bacteriology: "The popularization of a science which viewed bacteria as enemies was followed by an ideology which portrayed its enemies as bacteria in turn . . . " (51) . This is all the more reason to approach the explanation of these metaphorical transpositions not only by way of a cultural-historical description but by way of a theoreticalcritical intervention.
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